InferenceA Conference at the University of Leipzig, June 27-29, 2022
THIS CONFERENCE WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR JULY 2020. DUE TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS IT HAS BEEN POSTPONED to June 27-29 2022.
Inference is the basic step of theoretical reasoning – the act through which we justify one belief by reference to other beliefs. One of the main challenges in accounting for inference is to show how such mental acts can be the bearers of logical justification, that is, how psychological events can be guided by logical norms. These questions have been at the center of wide-ranging philosophical debates in the last decade, involving philosophers of logic, philosophers of mind and epistemologists. The aim of this three-day international conference is to bring together philosophers whose work sheds new light on the topic.
The conference is organized by Eric Marcus (Auburn) and Gilad Nir (Leipzig).
The conference is funded by generous grants from the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgeemeinschaft) and from the RAL (Reserach Academy Leipzig).
- Corine Besson (Sussex)
- Jonas Held (Leipzig)
- Natalia Waits Hickman (Oxford)
- Ulf Hlobil (Concordia)
- Eric Marcus (Auburn)
- Ram Neta (UNC)
- Gilad Nir (Leipzig)
- Sebastian Rödl (Leipzig)
- James Shaw (Pittsburgh)
- Markos Valaris (UNSW)
- Maria Van der Schaar (Leiden)
Vortragssaal der Bibliotheca Albertina