Publications Enabled by FAGI

The following is a regularly updated list of publications by our visiting scholars that were funded through fellowships and stipends granted by the Humboldt Project or otherwise enabled through the sponsorship of the Project.

The publications below are listed in inverse chronological order according to the year the publication itself appeared. At the very bottom of this page you will find a list of forthcoming articles.

For many of the publications, if you click on the title you can access them directly from this page. 

2021

Amichai Amit

The Unity of Virtue and Goodness
The Journal of Value Inquiry

ABSTRACT:

Virtue ethics often finds itself under an existential threat of sorts. Unlike proponents of either deontological or teleological ethical theories, virtue ethicists are asked not only to defend their own views but also to prove that virtue ethics is a distinctive kind of ethical theory in the first place. Time and again, critics of virtue ethics have not only pointed to its theoretical flaws, but raised doubts as to whether virtuous character is a primary evaluative standard, suggesting, time and again, that virtuous character is derivative of either of a teleological standard (i.e., the goodness of aims) or a deontological standard (i.e., duties). Moreover, though virtue ethicists have repeatedly and ingeniously defended their grounds, and though virtue ethics has gained incontrovertible prominence in the last decades, its opponents still doubt whether virtuous character can be a primary evaluative principle at all.

Silver Bronzo

Propositional Complexity and the Frege-Geach Point
Synthese

ABSTRACT:

It is almost universally accepted that the Frege-Geach Point is necessary for explaining the inferential relations and compositional structure of truth-functionally complex propositions. I argue that this claim rests on a disputable view of propositional structure, which models truth-functionally complex propositions on atomic propositions. I propose an alternative view of propositional structure, based on a certain notion of simulation, which accounts for the relevant phenomena without accepting the Frege-Geach Point. The main contention is that truth-functionally complex propositions do not include as their parts truth-evaluable propositions, but their simulations, which are neither forceful nor truth-evaluable. The view makes room for the idea that there is no such thing as the forceless expression of propositional contents and is attractive because it provides the resources for avoiding a fundamental problem generated by the Frege-Geach Point concerning the relation between forceless and forceful expressions of propositional contents. I further argue that the acceptance of the Frege-Geach Point mars Peter Hanks’ and François Recanati’s recent attempts to resist the widespread idea that assertoric force is extrinsic to the expression of propositional contents. Rejecting this idea, I maintain, requires a deeper break with the tradition than Hanks and Recanati have allowed for.

Cora Diamond

Wittgenstein’s “Unbearable Conflict”
Theorema

ABSTRACT:

My aim is to explain the puzzling remark at Philosophical Investigations §107, where
Wittgenstein describes the apparent conflict between actual language and the require- ments which he thought language had to satisfy. I draw on Jonathan Lear’s account of one of his patients and the apparently inexorable structure of her thinking. Lear’s account provides conceptual tools helpful for understanding Wittgenstein’s ‘unbearable conflict’.

Anil Gomes

Unity and objectivity in Strawson and Cassam
Analytic Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

Some comments on Quassim Cassam’s Self and World writ-ten for a conference at the Institute of Philosophy in 2017. I consider the objection that Cassam raises to Strawson’s argument from unity to objectivity in The Bounds of Sense and raise some general questions about Cassam’s problem of misconception and its application to transcendental arguments.

Anil Gomes, A. W. Moore, Andrew Stephenson

On the Necessity of the Categories
The Philosophical Review

ABSTRACT:

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character.

David Horst

Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?
Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill.

Christoph König

The Unutterable as a Mode of Utterance: Wittgenstein’s Two Remarks on “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn” by Ludwig Uhland
Wittgenstein Studien, Band 12, Heft 1

ABSTRACT:

Uhlands poem has found fame as a litmus test in philosophical debates about WittgensteinTractatus. Like many works of art, the poem is dynamically produced in its effort to resolve a fundamental conflict. The poemconflict arises from the difficulty to connect the counts life and his daydream. In the end, the poem as a whole serves to embody a critique of the capacity of a daydream to recover memories faithfully. Wittgenstein makes two remarks in a 1917 letter to Paul Engelmann that pertain to the poem. They are to be read in keeping with a resolute reading (James Conant, Cora Diamond) of theTractatus; Wittgensteins first remark imitates the very movement of thought we find in the poemand in doing so Wittgenstein makes good on his claim to talk about the poem: the unutterable is,unutterablycontained in what is uttered.His second remark has, thus far, played no role in literatureWittgenstein speaks of Engelmanns dreams, yet he does not explicitly formulate the poems bearing on them. Here, too, he reenacts, in the formulation of his remark, the core conflict ofthe poem. My interpretation of the poem, finally, distinguishes three interpretive approaches (symbolistic, realistic, critical) in order to capture the understanding of the poem embodied in Wittgensteins remarks

Eric Marcus

Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind
OUP

ABSTRACT:

It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person’s beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind—what makes it one mind—is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can’t believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Review: Thinking and Being
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Tyke Nunez

Kant, Frege, and the normativity of logic: MacFarlane’s argument for common ground
European Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

According to what used to be the standard view (Poincaré, Wang, etc.), although Frege endorses, and Kant denies, the claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic, there is not a substantive disagreement between them because their conceptions of logic are too different. In his “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,” John MacFarlane aims to establish that Frege and Kant do share enough of a conception of logic for this to be a substantive, judicable dispute. MacFarlane maintains that for both Frege and Kant, the fundamental defining characteristic of logic is “that it provides norms for thought as such” (MacFarlane, 2002, p.57). I defend the standard view. I show that MacFarlane’s argument rests on conflating the way that pure general logic is normative as a canon and as a propaedeutic, and that once these are distinguished the argument is blocked.

Thomas Pendlebury

The Shape of the Kantian Mind
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March 8

ABSTRACT:

Kant’s readers have disagreed about whether, according to his account of cognition, concepts, representations of the understanding, are involved in intuitions, representations of sensibility. But proponents of the affirmative ‘conceptualist’ answer and those of the negative ‘non‐conceptualist’ answer have alike presupposed that such involvement should be construed in a particular way: i.e., as the involvement of particular concepts in particular exercises of sensibility. I argue, on the contrary, that it should not be: that though, for Kant, no concepts are applied in exercises of sensibility, nonetheless the understanding, the faculty of concepts, is teleologically internal to sensibility and, therefore, to its exercises. That is, those exercises are per se directed towards the provision to the understanding of objects to which its fundamental concepts, the categories, are applicable, though no act of categorical application is internal to them. This conception of sensibility, available only in light of a careful distinction between capacities and acts, is demanded, I argue, by Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge as elaborated in his Transcendental Deduction.

Thomas Pendlebury

The Real Problem of Pure Reason
European Journal of Philosophy, May 16

ABSTRACT:

The problem of Kant’s first Critique is the problem of pure reason: how are synthetic judgments possible a priori? Many of his readers have believed that the problem depends upon a delimitation within the class of a priori truths of a class of irreducibly synthetic truths—a delimitation whose possibility is doubtful—because absent this it is not excluded that all a priori truths are analytic. I argue, on the contrary, that the problem depends on nothing more than the human knower’s everyday consciousness of her own finitude: her dependence in thinking and knowing on what is given to her. The problem is a difficulty about how the concepts which figure in metaphysical judgments could represent reality given that they cannot do so in the way in which concepts figuring in empirical judgments do. Empirical judgment here functions as exemplary of thought and knowledge because it is exemplary of finite thought and knowledge. Mere analysis could not, therefore, dissolve the problem even in principle, because to say that a concept can be analyzed is not yet to explain the possibility of its real representative power. The significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction in the context of the problem of pure reason is that its formulation allows Kant to say this.

Bastian Reichardt

Das wollende Subjekt Annäherungen an Wittgensteins Ethik
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 75/1

ABSTRACT:

One of the basic notions of ethics is certainly the concept of the will. Although in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein excludes that ethical sentences can be meaningfully formulated, the conception of the will occupies a prominent position in his book. This supposed tension in the Tractatus is not accidental, but an integral part of Wittgensteins concern to reach a new, non- philosophical approach towards ethics.

Martin Stone & Rafeeq Hasan

What is Provisional Right?
The Philosophical Review

ABSTRACT:

Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such claims are merely “provisional”; they become “conclusive” only in a civil condition involving political institutions. Kant’s commentators find this thesis puzzling, since it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property’s conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action (that of acquiring ordinary rights) where public authorization is lacking. Provisional right thereby functions as a methodological device in a sequential elucidation of the moral basis of public law. To develop this reading, we first explain Kant’s two-step account of property rights—his division between ‘having’ and ‘acquiring.’ Then we explain what is involved in a sequential exposition of “right” more generally.

Jônadas Techio

The Threat of Solipsism
De Gruyter, Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research  16

ABSTRACT:

Much attention has been paid to Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism and to Cavell’s treatment of skepticism. But comparatively little has been made of the striking connections between the early Wittgenstein’s view on the truth of solipsism and Cavell’s view on the truth of skepticism, and how that relates to the claim that the later Wittgenstein sees privacy as a constant human possibility.

This book offers close readings of representative writings by both authors and argues that an adequate understanding of solipsism and skepticism requires taking into account a set of underlying difficulties related to a disappointment with finitude which might ultimately lead to the threat of solipsism. That threat is further interpreted as a wish not to bear the burden of having to constantly negotiate and nurture the fragile connections with the world and others which are the conditions of possibility for finite beings to achieve meaning and community.

By presenting Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s responses in an order which reflects the chronology of their writings, the result is a cohesive articulation of some under-appreciated aspects of their philosophical methodologies which has the potential of reorienting our entire reading of their work.

Wim Vanrie

Review of New Essays on Frege
Nordic Wittgenstein Review

David Wellbery

Form (Form)
In: Goethe Lexicon of Philosophical Concepts

ABSTRACT:

The concept of form today remains as indispensable to philosophical reflection as it was for Plato and Aristotle. In view of its centrality to Goethe’s work, the concept may thus be considered one of the privileged themes for assessing Goethe’s position in the Western philosophical tradition. The following remarks must pursue a more modest aim. Their purpose is to highlight sites of reflection in Goethe’s oeuvre in which the concept of form does irreplaceable intellectual work.

2020

Matthew Abbott

On Film in Reality: Cavellian Reflections on Skepticism, Belief, and Documentary
In: D. LaRocca: The Thought of Stanley Cavell and Cinema. Bloomsburry.

ABSTRACT:
There is a pervasive myth that audiences who first viewed The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat – one of the most famous actualités produced by the Lumière brothers – panicked at the sight of a locomotive apparently bearing down on them. This paper explores the philosophical significance of this myth, arguing that our love of the apocryphal story betrays our attachment to a skeptical picture of the relation between self and world. Following Stanley Cavell, Michael Fried, and James Conant, the paper then clarifies the form of pretense on display in the work, in which real people played themselves on film, and the ambiguous role of belief in documentary. 

Anastasia N. A. Berg

Kant on moral self‐opacity
European Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:
It has been widely accepted that Kant holds the “Opacity Thesis,” the claim that we cannot know the ultimate grounds of our actions. Understood in this way, I shall argue, the Opacity Thesis is at odds with Kant’s account of practical self‐consciousness, according to which I act from the (always potentially conscious) representation of principles of action and that, in particular, in acting from duty I act in consciousness of the moral law’s determination of my will. The Opacity Thesis thus threatens to render acting from duty unintelligible. To diffuse the threat, I argue, first, that we need not attribute the Opacity Thesis to Kant. Kant’s concern with the ubiquity of moral self‐opacity does not imply the strong skeptical conclusion that knowledge of the grounds of one’s action is impossible. Second, I show how moral self‐opacity in cases of morally bad action emerges from the intrinsic inability of representing to oneself what one is doing, insofar one is pursuing the indeterminate end of “happiness.” 

Silver Bronzo

Actions, Products, and Truth-Bearers: A Critique of Twardowskian Accounts
Canadian Journal of Philosphy

ABSTRACT:
Friederike Moltmann has recently proposed an account of truth-bearers that draws on Kazimierz Twardowski’s action/product distinction. Her account is meant to provide a third way between the dominant view of primary truth-bearers as mind-independent entities and the recently revived construal of them as mental or linguistic acts. This paper argues that there is no room for Twardowskian accounts because they are based on a notion of “nonenduring product” that defies comprehension, and no need for them because the linguistic data that Twardowskians take to refute the act-theoretic approach can, in fact, be handled by that approach.

Christian Erbacher

Wittgenstein’s Heirs and Editors
Cambridge University Press

ABSTRACT:

Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most widely read philosophers of the twentieth century. But the books in which his philosophy was published – with the exception of his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – were posthumously edited from the writings he left to posterity. How did his 20,000 pages of philosophical writing become published volumes? Using extensive archival material, this Element reconstructs and examines the way in which Wittgenstein’s writings were edited over more than fifty years, and shows how the published volumes tell a thrilling story of philosophical inheritance. The discussion ranges over the conflicts between the editors, their deviations from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts, other scholarly issues which arose, and also the shared philosophical tradition of the editors, which animated their desire to be faithful to Wittgenstein and to make his writings both available and accessible. The Element can thus be read as a companion to all of Wittgenstein’s published works of philosophy.

Simon Gurofsky

On the Putative Possibility of Non-Spatio-Temporal Forms of Sensibility in Kant
European Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

This paper defends Kant against a neo‐Hegelian line of criticism, recently advanced by John McDowell, Robert Pippin, and Sebastian Rödl, targeting Kant’s alleged claim that forms of sensibility other than space and time are possible. If correct, the criticism identifies a deep problem in Kant’s position and points toward Hegel’s position and method as its natural solution. I show that Kant has the philosophical resources to respond effectively to the criticism, notably including the set of claims about the limits of meaningful thought that P. F. Strawson calls Kant’s “principle of significance.” By Kant’s lights, first, the concept “non‐spatio‐temporal form of sensibility” is meaningless, so he cannot meaningfully grant that such a form is possible; and second, there is no need to prove (e.g., from reflection on pure intellect) that non‐spatio‐temporal forms of sensibility are impossible, because insofar as the concept “knowing” means anything, that meaning is provided by our own always‐already‐spatio‐temporal case. An upshot of the argument is that Kant’s two “stems” of knowledge or cognition, sensibility and understanding, are merely aspects of a single epistemic capacity rather than each a separate capacity in its own right. Many today are unwilling to take Kant’s claims about the limits of meaningful thought at face value, notwithstanding their ubiquity and explicitness. This paper is therefore an indirect argument on behalf of that dimension of Kant’s position: We have something significant to lose in not taking it seriously.

Martin Gustafsson

Making the Best of Austin’s Goldfinch
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

ABSTRACT:

This paper discusses Austin’s goldfinch example from “Other Minds,” which plays a central role in Kaplan’s Austin’s Way with Skepticism. The paper aims to clarify the obscure distinction Austin makes in connection with this example, between cases in which we know and can prove and cases in which we know but can’t prove. By discussing a couple of remarks that Austin makes in passing, a view is extracted from his text that stands in conflict with Kaplan’s reading at a fundamental point. The view proposed emphasizes the role of law-like generics in our practice of knowledge attribution, and brings out the disjunctivist elements in Austin’s conception. It is argued that the response to skepticism that Kaplan ascribes to Austin is not fully satisfactory, since it fails to tell us what makes some challenges to our knowledge claims appropriate and others outrageous. The alternative view proposed in this paper can handle this problem without postulating the sort of general external criterion that Kaplan’s Austin rightly rejects.

Adrian Haddock

Review of Thinking and Being by Irad Kimhi
Mind, vol. 129, no. 515

Christian Kietzmann

Practical Knowledge and Error in Action
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

ABSTRACT:

G.E.M. Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge raises a puzzle for cases of practical error, i.e. cases where, due to a mistake of mine, I am not in fact doing what I mean to be doing. It can seem that in such cases, we must both affirm and deny the presence of practical knowledge. It must be present, because practical error presupposes that there is an intentional action in which the mistake occurs, which in turn presupposes practical knowledge as a formal‐causal condition. At the same time, practical knowledge can’t be present, because I am not doing what I think I am doing, and therefore can’t have knowledge of what I am doing. I discuss and reject various attempts to deal with the problem. The solution I propose and defend against objections relies on applying the Aristotelian‐Thomistic conceptual framework of form and matter to intentional action.

Eric Marcus

Inference as Consciousness of Necessity
Analytic Philosophy, Volume 128, Issue 512

ABSTRACT:

Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress.

Eric Marcus

Wanting and Willing
European Journal of Philosophy, October 23, 2020.

ABSTRACT:

How homogenous are the sources of human motivation? Textbook Humeans hold that every human action is motivated by desire, thus any heterogeneity derives from differing objects of desire. Textbook Kantians hold that although some human actions are motivated by desire, others are motivated by reason. One question in this vicinity concerns whether there are states such that to be in one is at once take the world to be a certain way and to be motivated to act: the state question. My question here is different: whether passion and reason constitute distinct sources of human motivation: the source question. In this essay, I defend an affirmative answer to the source question while remaining neutral on the state question. I distinguish between what I call orectic desires, which are associated with the appetites, and anorectic desires, which are associated with judgments of the good. I argue that the two sorts of desires constitute distinct sources of motivation initially on the basis of their differing epistemological profiles. Specifically, self‐attributions of anorectic desires are governed by the transparency condition; self‐attributions of orectic desires are not. It emerges from this discussion that the motivation for performing an action arises in very different ways from each sort of desire.

Christian Georg Martin

Die Einheit des Sinns
mentis

ABSTRACT:

Die Untersuchung zielt auf eine systematische Begründung der von Frege und Wittgenstein initiierten sprachphilosophischen Wende. Ihr zentrales Thema ist das Verhältnis zwischen Gedanken und ihrem Ausdruck. Entwickelt wird eine neuartige Begründung dafür, dass wir im Denken nicht zufällig auf den Gebrauch von Ausdrücken angewiesen sind. Vielmehr sind Gedanken notwendig an Ausdruck gekoppelt, ohne sich mit diesem gleichsetzen zu lassen. Dabei wird die logisch-philosophische Wende zur Sprache zu einer Wende zum Ausdruck verallgemeinert: Dem sprachlich artikulierten Denken muss ein vorsprachliches Denken vorangehen, dessen Ausdruck etwa gestisch-mimischer Art sein kann. Allerdings weist das vorsprachliche Denken aufgrund seiner eigenen Beschränktheit über sich hinaus. Die Untersuchung erweist die Sprache so als Leistung der Vernunft statt als bloß naturhafte Voraussetzung von deren Ausübung.

Christian Georg Martin

Ursprünge Transzendentaler Ästhetik. Zum Wandel von Kants Raum- und Zeitargumentation von der Inauguraldissertation zur Kritik
Kant-Studien, Band 111 Heft 3

ABSTRACT:

According to a widespread view, the essentials of Kant’s critical conception of space and time as set forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic can already be found in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. Contrary to this assumption, the present article shows that Kant’s later arguments for the a priori intuitive character of our original representations of space and time differ crucially from those contained in the Dissertation. This article highlights profound differences between Kant’s transcendental and his pre-critical conception of pure sensibility by systematically comparing the topic, method and argumentation of the First Critique with that of the Inaugural Dissertation. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetics itself, which allows one to distinguish its peculiar transcendental mode of argumentation from considerations made by the pre-critical Kant, with which it can easily be conflated.

Steven Methven

Ramsey’s Record: Wittgenstein on Infinity and Generalisation
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020.

ABSTRACT:

There is, in the Ramsey Archive at the Hillman Library of the University of Pittsburgh, a note, written in 1929, in Ramsey’s hand and mostly in German, consisting of twenty paragraphs the contents of which deal, in large part, with the infinite and generality. In this article, I provide an English translation of that note, followed by a philosophical commentary. The purpose of the commentary is to bring out the connections and, most importantly, the differences between Wittgenstein’s and Ramsey’s thought on these topics in 1929.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Vérité conceptuelle, nécessité et négation
In: Lectures de Hilary Putnam, Klesis, 47

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Anscombe’s Account of Voluntary Action in Intention
Enrahonar: an International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason, 64

ABSTRACT:

It might seem that Anscombe’s book Intention dismisses the concept of the voluntary as of secondary philosophical significance. However, this impression is misconceived and stems from a misunderstanding of Anscombe’s philosophy of action in general and the contri- bution of Intention in particular. The main contention of this essay is that to understand the scope and nature of the contribution of Intention to an understanding of the voluntary we must come to terms with not only the positive account that the book advances on the basis of its methods but also the nature of the problems that it deliberately leaves out, based on these same methods, on the grounds that they involve considerations pertaining to ethics. This essay is divided into seven sections. The introductory section expounds the charge that Intention relegates the concept of the voluntary into the periphery of the philosophy of action. The next section places §49 within Intention as a whole. It seeks to explain why a systematic account of the voluntary is deferred until such a late stage in the inquiry. I then proceed to give a commentary of section §49 with the aim of unpacking and defending the various insights that are there systematically brought together against the background of the pivotal distinction between the intentional and the voluntary. Sections 3 to 6, which constitute the main bulk of this essay, are respectively devoted to the four headings under which Anscombe successively apprehends the distinction between the intentional and the voluntary in §49. Finally, in the last section, I try to bring out the underlying unity of the account of the voluntary given in §49 as well as the deliberate nature of the limitations in this account.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Conceptual Truth, Necessity, and Negation
The Monist, Volume 103 Issue 4

ABSTRACT:

Throughout his philosophical career, Hilary Putnam was preoccupied with the question of what survives of the traditional notion of a priori truth in light of the recurring historical phenomenon, made prominent by the scientific revolutions of the early decades of the twentieth century, through which “something that was literally inconceivable has turned out to be true” (1962b). Impugning the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, Putnam’s redefinition of “conceptual truth” in terms of “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme” is meant to accommodate the possibility of transitions of just this sort. In this essay, I trace the origins and development of Putnam’s account of “quasi-necessity.” I try to defend it against some objections naturally arising in connection with the interplay of modality and negation. My main contention is that the main tenets of Putnam’s semantic externalism inform his reconception of conceptual truth, and that they must be recognized to hold of such basic logical notions as those of judgment and negation.

Alexandra Newton

Kant on Negation
Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-20

ABSTRACT:

Contrary to the contemporary view that negation is a logical operation that modifies the mere content of a thought or judgment, but not the act of thinking or judging it, Kant maintains that negation is an act of logical apperception through which I exclude a thought or judgment from what I think.In this paper, I argue against two interpretations of Kants account of logical negation. According to the first, negation is a subjective psychological act of excluding an erroneous judgment. Against this, I will show that for Kant, negation is an operation of logical, not empirical apperception. The second interpretation views logical negation as an objective representation either of a relation of opposition or of non-being. I argue that, on the contrary, the logical function of negation is merely formal, not material, and therefore does not have semantic content. The papers final section develops a positive conception of logical negation as a formal function of judging.

Rory O’Connell

“I Do What Happens”: The Productive Character of Practical Knowledge
Canadian Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that to do this, we must appreciate the role of know-how or skill in practical knowledge.

Bastian Reichardt

Avowals and the Project of Inferentialism
Philosophical Studies

ABSTRACT:

Whether there are philosophically relevant connections between the expressive role of first-personal vocabulary and self-knowledge is an on-going debate in analytical philosophy. We will take a look at this debate by considering Ludwig Wittgenstein’s distinction between the two uses of ‘I’ as object and as subject and work out a further distinction within the subject-use of ‘I’. This relates to a problem that is inherent in Robert Brandom’s inferentialist program regarding the role of first-personal vocabulary. It can be shown that subject-related aspects of language are necessary elements of inferentially articulated discourses—and not, like Brandom assumes, merely contingent features.

Ryan Simonelli

The Normative/Agentive Correspondence
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

In recent work, Robert Brandom (2008. Between Saying and Doing. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2019. A Spirit of Trust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) has articulated important connections between the deontic normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the alethic modal statuses of possibility and necessity. In this paper, I articulate an until now unexplored connection between Brandom’s core normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the agentive modal statuses of ability and compulsion. These modals have application not only in action, but also in perception and inference, and, in both of these cases, there is a direct mapping between the normative statuses that one bears towards various claims, articulated from the perspective of the attributor of commitments and entitlements, and the agentive modal statuses that one bears towards various judgments, articulated from the perspective of the undertaker of commitments. I will highlight this correspondence, focusing on the case of perception, and show how it sheds light on the account of mindedness that emerges from Brandom’s theory of discursive practice.

Guido Tana

Unlikely Bedfellows? On a recent rapprochement between Hegel and Wittgenstein
verifice: Hegel and/in/on Translation

 

Jônadas Techio

The Threat of Privacy in Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Kripke vs. Cavell
Wittgenstein Studien, Vol 11

ABSTRACT:

Most readers of the Investigations take skepticism as a target of Wittgenstein’s remarks, something to be refuted by means of a clear grasp of our criteria. Stanley Cavell was the first to challenge that consensual view by reminding us that our criteria are constantly open to skeptical repudiation, hence that privacy is a standing human possibility. In an apparently similar vein, Saul Kripke has argued that a skeptical paradox concerning rules and meaning is the central problem of the Investigations – and one that receives a skeptical solution. Following the orthodoxy, however, Kripke does not take privacy as a real threat but instead reads Wittgenstein as offering an argument against its very possibility. This paper offers a critical assessment of Kripke’s and Cavell’s readings, and concludes by delineating an understanding of our linguistic practices that acknowledges the seriousness of skepticism while avoiding the kind of evasion shared by Kripke and the orthodoxy, enabling us to see agreement and meaning as continual tasks whose failure is imbued with high existential costs.

Wim Vanrie

Some Problems with the Anti-Luminosity-Argument
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

ABSTRACT:

I argue that no successful version of Williamson’s anti‐luminosity‐argument has yet been presented, even if Srinivasan’s further elaboration and defence is taken into account. There is a version invoking a coarse‐grained safety condition and one invoking a fine‐grained safety condition. A crucial step in the former version implicitly relies on the false premise that sufficient similarity is transitive. I show that some natural attempts to resolve this issue fail. Similar problems arise for the fine‐grained version. Moreover, I argue that Srinivasan’s defence of the more contentious fine‐grained safety condition is also unsuccessful, again for similar reasons.

Wim Vanrie

Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?
British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. To come to a better understanding of Frege’s response, I investigate his conception of the nature of the logical categories, and how it differs from Russell’s. I argue that, for Frege, our grasp of the logical categories cannot be severed from our grasp of the Begriffsschrift notation itself. Russell, on the other hand, attaches no such importance to notation. From Frege’s point of view, Russell has not succeeded in presenting an alternative conception of the logical hierarchy, since such a conception must go together with the development of a notation. Moreover, Frege has good reasons to think that Russell’s proposal does not admit of a suitable notation.

Edward Witherspoon

Wittgenstein versus Zombies: An Investigation of our Mental Concepts
In: S. Wuppuluri and N. da Costa: Wittgensteinian. Springer.

ABSTRACT:
Many philosophers think that there could be a creature that looks, talks, and acts just like a human being but that has no inner awareness, no feelings, no qualia.  These philosophers call such a hypothetical being a ‘zombie’, and they use the possibility of zombies to support central claims in the philosophy of mind.  In this essay, I use Wittgensteinian ideas to argue, against such philosophers, that the notion of a zombie is incoherent.  My argument shows, first, that the possibility of zombies would entail a radical form of skepticism about other minds.  I then use that result to argue that philosophers who believe zombies are possible cannot account for the meaningfulness of terms like ‘pain’, ‘qualia’, and  ‘phenomenal consciousness’.  Since philosophers who think zombies are possible need such language in order to describe their position, I conclude that such philosophers employ words to which they can give no meaning.  I close the essay by reflecting on the nature of my arguments and by drawing some Wittgensteinian conclusions about the character of our mental concepts.

2019

Silver Bronzo

Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein
In: J. Conan & S. Sunday (Eds.): Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning

ABSTRACT:

Paul Horwich has advocated, and attributed to the later Wittgenstein, a “use-theory of meaning” that aims to demystify meaning by reducing it to pure regularities of use. This chapter challenges Horwich’s appropriation of Wittgenstein and seeks to make room for a different conception of the demystification of meaning. It argues that Wittgenstein does indeed aim to demystify meaning, but does not think that this involves any attempt to reduce meaning to something else.

Silver Bronzo

Forms of Life and Social Critique: Pasolini after Wittgenstein
In: Crisis and Critique: Philosophical Analysis and Current Events

ABSTRACT:

Drawing on Pier Paolo Pasolini and his appropriation of Wittgenstein, this paper argues for the possibility of a radical sort of social critique based on the notion of form of life: the members of a society may not only have an objectionable form of life, but also lack a form of life altogether. 

Silver Bronzo

Truth-Bearers in Frege and the Tractatus
Analiza i Egzystencja

ABSTRACT:

This paper argues that the Tractatus breaks deeply with Frege’s account of truth-bearers as mind-independent entities, and is closer to the act-theoretic approach recently defended, for example, by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. For the Tractatus, the primary truth-bearers are facts-in-use, which essentially involve acts, as well as facts functioning as instruments of representation. The Tractarian account, it is further argued, can vindicate three platitudes that constitute the main motivation of Frege’s approach.

Christian Erbacher

“Ludwig Wittgenstein” – A BBC Radio Talk by Elizabeth Anscombe in May 1953
Nordic Wittgenstein Review, Vol 8 No 1-2

ABSTRACT:

Presented here is the transcript of a BBC radio broadcast by Elizabeth Anscombe that was recorded in May 1953 – the month when Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations appeared in England for the first time. In her radio talk, Anscombe provides some biographical and philosophical background for reading the Philosophical Investigations. She addresses the importance of the Tractatus and of the literary qualities of Wittgenstein’s writing. Anscombe warns that it would be fruitless to adopt slogans from Wittgenstein without insight. She also calls it a misunderstanding to think that Wittgenstein had championed something like the Ordinary Language Philosophy as it was practised at the time of the recording.

David H. Finkelstein

Making the Unconscious Conscious
In: R.G.T. Gipps, M. Lacewing (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

ABSTRACT:

How should we understand the distinction between conscious states of mind and unconscious ones? This chapter briefly reviews an answer to this question that the author has set out and defended in earlier work; it then suggests a new answer—one that supplements, rather than replaces, the old answer. In spelling out this new answer, the chapter offers an account of a distinction that is related to, but not identical with, that between conscious and unconscious states of mind, viz. the distinction between conscious and unconscious expressions.

Rose Ryan Flynn

True or False?
Review of Irad Kimhi’s “Thinking and Being”, TLS

Jennifer Frey

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good
Ergo, Vol 6 No 39

ABSTRACT:

This paper addresses how Elizabeth Anscombe understands the link between action theory and ethics, by focusing on her theory of practical knowledge. I argue that, for Anscombe, a capacity for practical knowledge is best understood as a capacity to do things for reasons, where reasons are the ends pursued by the agent as practically in- telligible goods; on this view, knowing what one is doing and knowing the intended good of doing it are two different aspects of one and the same practical knowledge. On my reading of Anscombe, the central task of action theory is to elucidate this capacity for practical knowledge, which is exercised anytime one acts in the charac- teristically human way (intentionally or voluntarily). The proper task of ethics, by contrast, is to elucidate the perfected exercise of this power in the practically wise or virtuous person—i.e., the one who is properly disposed to act for the right reasons and thus lives well.

Wolfram Gobsch

Autonomy and radical evil: a Kantian challenge to constitutivism
Philosophical Explorations, 22

ABSTRACT:

Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to comply with it is to be understood as a deficiency in one’s integrity as an intentional agent. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments to the conclusion that immorality, moral evil, consists in choosing to give one’s unity as an intentional agent supremacy over the moral law, and that one’s being subject to the moral law must be one’s own free choice. And I explain how Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which we cannot be subject to the moral law without actually being morally evil, protects this conclusion from entailing the denial of the unconditionally binding character of moral principles, which character constitutivists correctly identify as the central concern of Kant’s – or any – moral philosophy.

Martin Gustafsson

Blind Obedience
Acta Philosophica Fennica

ABSTRACT:

In a discussion of Wittgenstein’s relation to the pragmatist tradition, Sami Pihlström (2012) criticizes what he calls “dichotomous” interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought. According to such interpretations, Wittgenstein defends one of two sides in a series of antithetical pairs: “propositional” vs. “non-propositional” conceptions of certainty, “anti-Cartesian fallibilism” vs. “the truth in skepticism”, “metaphysics” vs. “criticism of metaphysics”, and “therapeutic” vs. “systematic” philosophy. Pihlström argues that such dichotomies foist upon Wittgenstein precisely the sort of schematic simplifications that his philosophy is meant to undermine.
In this paper, I will look at yet another dichotomy that is often allowed to shape readings of Wittgenstein, namely, that between action and thought. According to Russell Goodman, Wittgenstein defends “the priority of practice over intellect” and this supposedly shows his affinity with pragmatist philosophers (Goodman 2002, quoted by Pihlström 2012, 4). Now, I do not want to deny that there are passages in Wittgenstein’s writings that can be used to support such an interpretation. Indeed, I would even admit that there is a sense in which it captures an important and genuinely Wittgensteinian point. However, insofar as the alleged priority of practice over intellect is construed in such a way that “practice” is seen as a separately conceivable, “non- intellectual” foundation for intellectual phenomena, I think we should be skeptical towards the idea that such a priority claim can be found in Wittgenstein’s work. Rather, the alleged dichotomy between practice and intellect is ultimately one that Wittgenstein would want to dissolve. According to him, making adequate sense of the notions of practice and intellect requires that we acknowledge their mutual interdependence, rather than conceive their relation in terms of some one-directed priority.

Johannes Haag, Till Hoeppner

Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

ABSTRACT:
We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical meta­physics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyses nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and it is thus not necessary to analyse anything but that form. We argue that the first con­ception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B­ Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibilities of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and neces­sary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfac­tion can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind­independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality.

Matthias Haase & Erasmus Mayr

Varieties of Constitutivism
Philosophical Explorations

Adrian Haddock

“I am NN”: A reconstruction of Anscombe’s “The First Person”
European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 12, no 4

ABSTRACT:
This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe’s essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe’s essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.

Adrian Haddock

Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person
C. Doyle, J. Milburn, D. Pritchard (eds.): New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, Routledge. 

Christian Kietzmann

Aristotle on the Definition of What It Is to Be Human
Keil, G. & Kreeft, N.: Aristotle’s Anthropology, CUP.
 

Nicholas Koziolek

Belief as the Power to Judge
Topoi 39

ABSTRACT:

A number of metaphysicians of powers have argued that we need to distinguish the actualization of a power from the effects of that actualization. This distinction, I argue, has important consequences for the dispositional theory of belief. In particular, it suggests that dispositionalists have in effect been trying to define belief, not in terms of its actualization, but instead in terms of the effects of its actualization. As a general rule, however, powers are to be defined in terms of their actualizations. I thus argue that belief has just one actualization, and that that actualization is a particular kind of mental act that I call a judgment. I explain the resulting view—that belief is the power to judge—and argue that it has some important advantages, not only over other dispositional theories of belief, but also over categorical theories of belief. Since these options are apparently exhaustive, it thus has important advantages over all other theories of belief.

Eric Marcus

Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception
Mind, Volume 128, Issue 512

ABSTRACT:

Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not (at least in a straightforward sense) lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she’s doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic of intentional action. This masking takes roughly the following form: when we are deceiving ourselves about what we are intentionally doing, we don’t think about our action because it’s painful to do so.

Christian Georg Martin

On Redrawing the Force-Content Distinction
Nordic Wittgenstein Review, Vol 8 No 1-2

ABSTRACT:

Frege distinguished the thought qua logical content from the assertoric force attached to it when judged to be true. The gist of this distinction is captured by the so-called Frege-Geach point. Recently, several authors have drawn inspiration from Wittgenstein to reject this point and the distinction it is based on. This article proceeds from the observation that Wittgenstein himself did not reject the force-content distinction but urged us to reformulate it in a non-dualistic way. While drawing on Wittgensteinian lessons about thought and its expression, the overall purpose of this paper is systematic, not exegetic: it seeks to contribute to the contemporary debate aboute force and content by arguing that this distinction should be redrawn in such a way as to exhibit force as internal to thought, namely, as that which provides for the unity of thought. To this end, it is investigated what it is for a thought to occur as a forceless part of a propositionally complex assertion (e. g. for p to occur as a part of the assertion that not p).

Steven Methven

Review of Irad Kimhi’s “Thinking and Being”
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019.

Steven Methven

Parricide: On Irad Kimhi’s “Thinking and Being”
The Point, October, 2019.

Jônadas Techio

The World Viewed and the World Lived: Stanley Cavell and Film as the Moving Image of Skepticism
In: Ch. Rawls, D. Neiva, S. S. Gouveia (Eds.): Film and Philosophy: Bridging Divides. Routledge.

ABSTRACT:

A central goal of Stanley Cavell’s work is to understand the emergence of modern skepticism and with it an image of ourselves as detached spectators looking at objects devoid of intrinsic meaning, giving way to a characteristic feeling of isolation and loss of contact with external reality. Now film, according to him, is the art that best encapsulates that condition, serving as a “moving image of skepticism.” This chapter attempts to elucidate that claim, arguing that Cavell’s exploration of our experience of photographs and movies provides an object of comparison capable of reminding us of aspects of our ordinary relation(s) to the world that have been largely repressed in our epistemological investigations since modernity, ultimately showing that the picture of a detached spectator that we tend to assume in those investigations falls apart once it is thought through. 

2018

Keren Gorodeisky, Eric Marcus

Aesthetic Rationality
The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 115, Issue 3

ABSTRACT:

We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment.

Martin Gustafsson

Why Is Frege’s Judgment Stroke Superfluous?
In: G. Bengtsson, S. Säätelä, A. Pichler (Eds.): New Essays on Frege

ABSTRACT:

Frege’s use of a judgment stroke in his conceptual notation has been a matter of controversy, at least since Wittgenstein rejected it as “logically quite meaningless” in the Tractatus. Recent defenders of Frege include Tyler Burge, Nicolas Smith and Wolfgang Künne, whereas critics include William Taschek and Edward Kanterian. Against the background of these defenses and criticisms, the present paper argues that Frege faces a dilemma the two horns of which are related to his early and later conceptions of asserted content respectively. On the one hand, if content is thought of as something that has propositional structure, then the judgment stroke is superfluous. On the other hand, if what is to the right of the judgment stroke is conceived as a sort of name designating a truth-value, then there is no consistent way to avoid construing the judgment stroke as a kind of predicate, and thereby fail to do justice to the act-character of judgment and assertion.

Martin Gustafsson

Category Mistakes and Ordinary Language
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal

Matthias Haase

Practically Self-Conscious Life
In: John Hacker-Wright (Ed.): Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue, Springer

ABSTRACT:

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism suggests that the sense of normative terms like “ought” and “good” as they appear in ethical discourse is to be elucidated in terms of the relation in which a living individual stands to the life-form or “species” of which it is an exemplar—in our case: the human life-form. A theory of this form has to provide a story about questions such as: What enables us to distinguish the different kinds of life within the theory? What makes them, despite those differences, all sorts of natural goodness? And where, in relation to those continuities and discontinuities, is the account of practical reason to be situated? In this paper, I investigate how a developed ethical naturalism has to conceive of the relation between the genus concept life and the concept of the specific kind of life characteristic of us: rational or practically self-conscious life. I argue that there is a deep ambiguity with respect to this question in the account Philippa Foot presents in Natural Goodness. An ambiguity that covers a dilemma. A properly developed ethical naturalism would have to develop the concept of reason out of the reflection on life.

Matthias Haase

The Representation of Language
In: Ch. Martin (Hrsg.): Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic – Investigations after Wittgenstein

ABSTRACT:

The contemporary debate on the metaphysics of language is dominated by two positions. According to the one, languages are not things in the world; they are abstract objects. According to the other, a language consists in the historical chain of causally interrelated acts and states of its speakers. The later Wittgenstein would reject both positions. A natural language is neither an abstract object nor a singular happening of any kind; it is something general that is actual or concrete. The difficulty to understand the peculiar kind of actuality of a language is, I argue, the source of the rule-following puzzle. Its solution consists in an investigation of the logical grammar of the statements with which speakers of a language describe their use of words. When we say what ‘we’ or ‘one’ says, the pronouns exhibit a kind genericity that cannot be treated with-in the quantificational model of generality.

Matthias Haase

Knowing What I Have Done
Manuscrito

ABSTRACT:

The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one’s achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one’s action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.

Irad Kimhi

Thinking and Being
Harvard University Press

ABSTRACT:

Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought—those that explicate how we in fact think—must be distinguished from logical laws of thought—those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction—that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously.

Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being marks a radical break with Frege’s legacy in analytic philosophy, exposing the flaws of his approach and outlining a novel conception of judgment as a two-way capacity. In closing the gap that Frege opened, Kimhi shows that the two principles of non-contradiction—the ontological principle and the psychological principle—are in fact aspects of the very same capacity, differently manifested in thinking and being.

As his argument progresses, Kimhi draws on the insights of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein to develop highly original accounts of topics that are of central importance to logic and philosophy more generally. Self-consciousness, language, and logic are revealed to be but different sides of the same reality. Ultimately, Kimhi’s work elucidates the essential sameness of thinking and being that has exercised Western philosophy since its inception.

Nicholas Koziolek

Belief as an Act of Reason
Manuscrito, Vol 41 No 4

ABSTRACT:

Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualizationof its subject’s rational capacities.

Joshua Mendelsohn

The Way Past the Stripping Argument in Hegel and Aristotle
In: G. A. Magee (Ed.): Hegel and Ancient Philosophy

ABSTRACT:

In the preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic, Hegel introduces his project by discussing the displacement of traditional metaphysics, claiming that his logical science makes up metaphysics. This chapter argues that Hegel and Aristotle both rely on a version of the so-called stripping argument in order to raise problems for a certain conception of determinacy. Hegel criticizes the type of solution that the Categories offers in ways that point in the direction of Aristotle’s later view expressed in Metaphysics. The chapter suggests that the ways Hegel and Aristotle respond to the predicament generated by the stripping argument also show parallels. The problems that Aristotle and Hegel raise for each candidate are not problems in the sense that they show certain characterizations of determinate particulars to be outright incorrect. Rather, the problems Hegel and Aristotle raise are problems with the independent intelligibility of each candidate.

Martin Palaunek

Old versus New Virtue – an Hegelian Remark on Virtue Ethics and the Unity of Virtues
The Virtue Blog

ABSTRACT:

In his Phenomenology of Spirit (§390), Hegel makes a striking comment on virtue ethics: modern theories of virtue produce only “emptiness” and “boredom”. He claims that they contain nothing real, only pompous rhetoric, and that they try to instill a pretentious sense of moral excellence in their readers with meaningless words. While Hegel criticizes contemporary attempts to virtue ethics quite harshly, he praises their ancient predecessors: Philosophers like Aristotle and Plato provided a robust and substantial account of the practical good and the virtues.Hegel obviously thinks that ancient theories of virtue succeeded where modern theories fail. Hegel explains that the main difference between these two different kinds of accounts is a logical one. He argues that modern theorists falsely depict virtue in the category of generality (Allgemeines) while ancient philosophers appropriately use the category of particularity (Besonderes). Unfortunately, Hegel’s terminology notoriously tends to obscure his arguments. In this text I try to sketch out a systematic reading that might not only help us to decode Hegel’s text but also might show us something about the logic of virtue – independently from Hegel’s other philosophical convictions and the historical context of the Phenomenology of Spirit. First, I will propose my interpretation of Hegel’s distinction between general and particular accounts of virtue (part II). Secondly, I will reconstruct Hegel’s argument why a proper concept of the virtues should be in the category of particularity (part III). Finally, I will mention an important consequence from this claim for the supposed unity of virtues.

David Wellbery

Schiller, Schopenhauer, Fried
In: M. Abbott: Michael Fried and Philosophy, Taylor & Francis

ABSTRACT:

The interlacing of normativity and innovative projection implicit in Michael Fried’s open concept of artistic practice sponsors an approach both to the criticism of contemporary work and to the study of the history of art that can be usefully compared with dramatic emplotment. The strategy of reconstruction of motivational complexes evinced in the early essay on Stella remains a constant across Fried’s work, as can be shown with respect to the groundbreaking essay on “Gericault’s Romanticism” from Another Light. Although Friedrich Schiller holds it to be deducible from the concept of reason, this thesis constitutes a bold and surprising stroke of the theoretical imagination, the thrust of which is inextricably to unite artistic achievement with the highest aspirations of human life. Like Denis Diderot, Schiller is concerned to align the very complexion of the aesthetic object—not simply its represented content—with nature, but the path he cuts toward this conceptual end does not run via the idea of the causal nexus constitutive of nature as totality.

Forthcoming

Daniel Carranza

‘Bloß ein Lehrgedicht:’ August Wilhelm Schlegels Lektüre von Schillers ‘Das Reich der Schatten.’
In: P.-A. Alt, S. Hundehege: Schillers Feste der Rhetorik. De Gruyter.

ABSTRACT:
Mein Artikel ist als eine kleine Lektüreübung zu betrachten, die darauf zielt, einen neuen interpretativen Zugang zu Schillers „Reich der Schatten“ zu eröffnen, indem das Gedicht von dem bekannten programmatischen Kontext der Schiller’schen Ästhetik um 1795 entkoppelt wird. Nachdem er im August und September desselben Jahres die „Elegie“ geschrieben hatte, rahmte er die frühere poetische Leistung neu, indem er das Gedicht in das System seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Gattungspoetik einbettete. Im Rückblick schien das Gedicht auf unbefriedigende Weise die gattungspoetische Systemstelle zu besetzen, die nun der Idylle zukam. In einem Brief an Wilhelm von Humboldt vom 29. November 1795 behauptet Schiller: „Mit der Elegie verglichen ist das Reich der Schatten bloß ein Lehrgedicht. Wäre der Inhalt des letztern so poetisch ausgeführt worden, wie der Inhalt der Elegie, so wäre es in gewissem Sinn ein Maximum.“ Dieses poetische Maximum war die Idylle, die von der „Ausführbarkeit der Idee in der Sinnenwelt“ zeugen sollte. Dieser neue gattungspoetologische Rahmen schraubte den Rang der eigenen dichterischen Leistung herunter, sodass das Gedicht nun als bloße Vorahnung einer künftigen Idylle anvisiert wurde. Wenn man solche Äußerungen für bare Münzen nimmt, dann fungiert das Gedicht als eine Art Seismograph, auf dem Schillers sich entwickelnde poetische Ambitionen lesbar werden. Der voreilige Enthusiasmus und die retrospektive Ernüchterung bilden dabei den bestimmenden kontextuellen Deutungsrahmen für das ‚Close Reading’ des Gedichts. Anstatt diesen Kontext zu privilegieren, werden meine Ausführungen einen alternativen, zeitgenössischen Rezeptionshorizont annehmen, nämlich genau den, den Schiller abgelehnt hatte und der ihn zur Revision des Gedichts trieb. August Wilhelm Schlegel hat diese Deutungsart auf eine für Schiller irritierende Formel gebracht, als er in seiner Rezension behauptete: „Der ganze Sinn des Gedichts liegt in dem Apfel Proserpinens begriffen.“ Die folgende Diskussion wird versuchen, das Gedicht von seiner Autorintention zu befreien, indem sie Schlegels Interpretation als eine gültige Deutungsmöglichkeit ernst nimmt. Dieser interpretative Ansatz sieht strategisch von Schillers späteren redaktionellen Eingriffen und ihrem Klärungsziel ab, um das epistemische Potenzial der strukturellen Ambiguität im Gedicht freizusetzen. Dabei erweist sich die sublexikalische Ebene der Textorganisation, insbesondere die durch Alliteration und den Stabreim hervorgerufenen klanglichen Assoziationsmuster, als entscheidend für die strategische Kontamination begrifflicher Dichotomien auf der semantischen Ebene der Figuration im Gedicht.  

Edward Guetti

Logic, Exemplarity, and Religious Belief.
In: N. Venturinha, D. Pritchard: Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion, OUP.

ABSTRACT:
In this chapter, I pursue a  reading of a puzzling remark from Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief, i.e., Wittgenstein’s remark that he is undermining reason. Rather than treating the “undermining of reason” as a direct result of particular problems that result from purported normative idiosyncrasies of religious belief, I connect the ‘undermining of reason’ to a longer trend of criticizing an idea of logical space, following Peter Winch’s suggestion to consult the Tractatus, but then illustrate how similar conceptions of logical space (which appear to be problematized in the Lectures on Religious Belief) are also the object of criticism in Philosophical Investigations as well as in the late Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough

Adrian Haddock

The Wonder of Signs
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

ABSTRACT:
Anscombe (1956) raises a difficulty for the very idea of quotation. Davidson (1979) seeks to dissolve this difficulty. But the difficulty is real. And its lesson is that, in quotation, language takes itself as its topic in a non-objectifying manner. This idea of a non-objectifying manner of being a topic is crucial, not merely for understanding quotation, but for understanding the distinctive form of sensory consciousness in which language is perceived.

Christian Kietzmann (Hg)

Teleological Structures in Human Life: Essays for Anselm W. Müller.
Abingdon: Routledge 2022.

Eric Marcus

Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind
Oxford University Press.

Berislav Marušić

On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love
Oxford University Press

ABSTRACT:
Suppose we suffer or witness a loss or injustice. Often we will respond with a combination of anger, grief, resentment, indignation or horror. And it seems that this is how it should be: the loss or injustice is the reason for our emotional response. However, it is a striking fact that our anger, grief or horror will diminish over time, often fairly quickly, even if the significance of the loss or injustice persists. We accommodate ourselves to what happens. Indeed, this is good for us, and it may even seem appropriate; it is often wrong to dwell on something. But how could accommodation be appropriate if the significance of the loss or injustice remains unchanged? And how could we make sense of accommodation when we anticipate it?

In On the Temporality of Emotions, I take up these questions and consider a number of possible responses to the puzzle of accommodation: an appeal to practical considerations, different accounts of the time-sensitivity of reasons, views of grief and anger as temporally extended processes, an analogy between accommodation and partiality, and a denial that grief and anger are reasons-responsive. However, I find all of them wanting. Instead, I argue that the puzzle of accommodation persists, because we suffer from a form of double-vision: In experiencing grief or anger we are apprehending a loss or injustice. Yet in our effort to understand the diminution of grief or anger, we apprehend ourselves. But because grief and anger are not about ourselves, our apprehension of the diminution of grief and anger is at odds with our apprehension of the objects of grief and anger. I argue that this is a structural and ineliminable feature of consciousness.
Nonetheless, I hold, accommodation can be reasonable. However, we can only understand this from a theoretical standpoint on ourselves and not from the standpoint of the reasons in light of which we experience grief or anger. From a theoretical standpoint, we can understand that, given the kinds of creatures we are and, in particular, given the empirical reality of grief and anger, it is all right that we should accommodate ourselves to loss and injustice. Yet we cannot point to the reasons in light of which this would be so.

Joshua Mendelsohn 

The “Premises Only” View of Syllogisms
In: C. Normore, G. Ciola, M. Crimini: Validity Throughout History. Philosophie Verlag.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Actions and their Elaboration
In: J. Floyd, S. Laugier, G. Chase: Cavell’s Must we Mean What We Say At Fifty. Cambridge University Press.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

The Elusiveness of the Voluntary
In: A. Haddock, R. Wiseman: Anscombean Minds. Routledge.

Jean-Philippe Narboux

Review of Irad Kimhi, Thinking and Being
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Fall 2020

Jean-Philippe Narboux

C.I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given
Q. Kammer, J.-P. Narboux, H. Wagner (Ed.), March 2021.

Tyke Nunez

Kant on Vitalism and The Analogy with Life
Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress ‘The Court of Reason.’ 

ABSTRACT:

In this essay I examine Kant’s analogy with life from §65 of the Critique of the power of Judgment. I argue that this analogy is central for understanding his notion of a natural end, for his account of the formative power of organisms in the third Critique, and for situating Kant’s account of this power in relation to the Lebenskräfte of the Vitalists. (There is overlap between §2-4 of this essay, and §3 of my “Kant on Plants: Self-activity, Representations, and the Analogy with Life.”)

Wim Vanrie

What we all know: Community in Moore’s A Defence of Common Sense
Journal of the History of Philosophy

ABSTRACT:
I defend an account of Moore’s conception of Common Sense – as it figures in A “Defence of Common Sense” – according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound by this common understanding, which cannot just be left behind or overcome, as they confusedly believe. On Moore’s conception, Common Sense becomes nothing other than the affirmation that there is Common Sense, the affirmation that there is such a common understanding. This yields a principled account of Common Sense as common knowledge that moves beyond a mere tallying of what contingently happens to be believed (or known) by all.