



Preface

“The analytic tradition” is the most familiar designation for an extraordinarily rich and multifaceted tradition of philosophical thought. Every philosophical movement starts life by responding to the problems and controversies that it inherits from the previous philosophical epoch. At its outset, the analytic tradition emerged from a range of interrelated attempts to come to terms with a constellation of intellectual difficulties that arose in the early modern period of Western cultural history—many of them tied to the rapid development of natural science following the revolutionary discoveries of Galileo (1564–1642) and Isaac Newton (1643–1727). It was accompanied by the emergence of a new austere and mathematically framed conception of nature, within which it appeared difficult to accommodate the most distinctive features of humanity—such as free will, consciousness, and a capacity for rational thought. And as perplexities regarding both the possibility and the nature of the logical and mathematical forms of explanation and thought took on a new prominence, theological answers to ultimate questions lost much of their intellectual prestige. Taken together, these developments fueled the emergence of novel and increasingly virulent forms of philosophical skepticism. Among the most notable were a series of seemingly intractable puzzles regarding how the various forms of human knowledge could even be possible, along with a parallel series of crises in the foundations of moral and political philosophy.

The early modern period in philosophy began with such late Renaissance thinkers as René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes in the early decades of the seventeenth century, and culminated in the mid-eighteenth century with David Hume’s radical philosophical skepticism—followed, at the end of the eighteenth century, by a radical new beginning that it prompted, in the form of the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This stretch of just under two hundred years can be, and often is, treated as a single integral chapter in the history of philosophy. The subsequent epoch, which to date has been slightly longer and certainly no less fertile, has been far less unified in character. If we were to give it a similar chronological label, we might call it philosophy’s “late modern” or “recent modern” period. Or it might simply be called “Modern Philosophy II: After Kant.”

There is no one comprehensive term for this later epoch in Western philosophy, however, for the conventional view of its past two centuries stresses an internal division—and that fundamental parting of philosophical ways issued in (at least) two parallel but diverging traditions of thought. Therefore, to provide an overview of this most recent epoch in the history of Western philosophy—from Kant to the present day—two volumes are needed: the present anthology and its companion, *The Interpretive Tradition*. (Perhaps in the

next epoch these divergent tributaries in Western philosophy will flow back together and reunite in a single current of thought.) These two volumes do not present a complete survey of the history of philosophy of the past two hundred years, but they do introduce readers to the two most important currents in Western philosophy after Kant. Each presents a range of thinkers who have figured prominently in the development of one of these two philosophical traditions.

Since the analytic tradition is still very much alive—continuously unfolding, transforming itself from within, and hence also constantly contesting and reinterpreting the meaning of its own past—no generalizations about its nature or character are free from scholarly controversy. Even the relatively modest question of exactly when it first began is a matter of dispute. Several possible answers are discussed in the general introduction below. Perhaps the least controversial is that the analytic tradition began with the publication of a fairly slender volume titled *Begriffsschrift*, whose pages are mostly filled with quasi-mathematical formulas—propositions expressed in a hitherto unknown logical notation that the volume as a whole seeks to introduce and explain. This remarkable little book, written by a mathematician named Gottlob Frege who was then little known, appeared in Jena, Germany, in 1879. Only in retrospect are we able to regard this publication—which appeared to almost no notice—as inaugurating a major philosophical tradition. Aided by historical hindsight, we can narrate the tradition's story from that starting point through a variety of high-water marks, eventually encompassing philosophical movements as diverse as logical atomism, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and scientific naturalism. Indeed, much of the philosophical activity of recent generations may be viewed as further moments in this selfsame tradition—a tradition that continues to generate new ways of taking up the philosophical past and thereby reinventing itself.

That this tradition is still in the process of defining itself can be seen in the lack of consensus about its relation to other philosophical traditions as well as to its own past. Thus, for example, the question of how to conceive the relation between the analytic tradition and the prior history of Western philosophy—the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and the early modern period through Kant—has been and remains a topic of considerable philosophical debate. One guiding theme of the present volume is the variety of sorts of continuity and discontinuity that one or another major analytic philosopher has claimed to identify between the analytic tradition and some prior chapter in the history of philosophy from which it sprang, against which it rebelled, and in relation to which it has sought to define itself. Further: what is the precise nature of the relation of analytic philosophy to ancient Greek and medieval Aristotelianism, British empiricism, Continental rationalism, German Idealism, and late nineteenth-century scientific naturalism? Very different answers to these questions—sometimes merely implicit, sometimes resoundingly explicit—can be found in the works of the individual representatives of the analytic tradition featured in the pages that follow.

A no less controversial set of questions revolves around the analytic tradition's relationship to a variety of neighboring philosophical traditions, such

as Idealism, Marxism, pragmatism, phenomenology, and existentialism, as each developed—sometimes independently of and sometimes in dialogue with the analytic tradition. With the exception of pragmatism, this volume does not systematically consider the analytic tradition’s responses to these parallel developments in the history of philosophy. In contextualizing the work of individual analytic philosophers throughout the pages that follow, however, we will often comment on these developments.

Many of them of European origin have often been grouped together by Anglophone analytic philosophers under the designation “Continental” (that is, Continental European) philosophy, employed as a catch-all (frequently disparaging) label for “what they call ‘philosophy’ over there.” This was no small irony; for while the Idealist, Marxist, phenomenological, and existentialist traditions of philosophical thought did indeed arise and develop primarily on the European continent, the analytic tradition itself also began in Germany (with Frege) and, until the 1930s, continued to flourish throughout the Continent’s German-speaking regions. It was only subsequently (after almost all of the Continent’s leading analytic philosophers had fled the Nazi menace) that there came to be some justification for associating analytic philosophy primarily with the United Kingdom and the United States. And even then, those émigrés from central Europe continued to make profound and distinctive contributions to the tradition in their new lands, drawing on the philosophical thinking they brought with them.

The label “Continental” is thus both historically inaccurate (as a contrast term to “analytic”) and uninformative. The companion volume to this anthology therefore employs the term “interpretive” to designate the other main tradition in Western philosophy after Kant. This designation has the advantage that, like “analytic” and unlike “Continental,” it broadly indicates the intellectual and methodological character of the tradition to which it applies. For, as that volume shows, the alternative post-Kantian tradition developed as an increasingly overt *contest of interpretations*, concerning issues that at least for a time diverged significantly from those on which the analytic tradition chiefly focused. We will follow that practice.

The development of the interpretive tradition affected the analytic tradition, which changed in response to its understanding not only of those ways of doing philosophy that it sought to champion but also of those it opposed and sought to replace. Indeed, the favor that the peculiar designation “Continental philosophy” found among Anglo-American analytic philosophers after the Second World War itself reveals something important about the way in which analytic philosophy came to view itself and its relation to its philosophical neighbors for some time. Rather than naming some parallel conception of philosophy whose self-understanding could be characterized in an alternative positive manner, a geographical term conveying otherness was employed (at least originally pejoratively) to refer to ways of purported philosophical thinking that were deemed to be completely opposite to genuine (analytic) philosophy, utterly devoid of its kind of clarity and rigor. And during the second half of the past century, one way analytic philosophers could regard themselves as having a common identity—their enormous differences notwithstanding—was through their use of this term for their collective “other,” thereby showing their allegiance to their agreement about what (analytic) philosophy was *not*.

The term “analytic” itself raises a number of questions. Why has it become attached to the tradition treated in this volume? (What does it have to do with “analysis” as this term is variously used in other contexts? Does it imply an opposition to or contrast with all forms of “synthesis” in philosophy?) What is its source, and how has its meaning changed? How did philosophy come to follow such very different paths in seeking to continue on from Kant, and why did one of those paths come to be designated “analytic”? Did this designation ever—and, if so, does it still—capture what is philosophically characteristic of and distinctive about the tradition with which it has come to be associated? These are among the questions explored in this volume.

The words “analysis” and “analytic” (and their virtually identical German and French counterparts) were terms of art in philosophy, mathematics, and chemistry well before the rise of analytic philosophy. The term “analytic” figures prominently in Kant’s “critical” philosophy, in which it is employed to characterize judgments whose truth depends solely on the logical relationships of the concepts involved. The use of “analytic” in association with the philosophical tradition explored here, however, derives from developments in mathematical logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Frege, who initiated them, discovering or determining whether some truth is genuinely analytic required the development and application of new logical tools. A half-century later, as the ensuing philosophical tradition that was coming to be known by that name developed, the term acquired a much broader sense and applicability, and came to be used to refer to many differing variations on the basic idea of rendering some philosophically puzzling idea or concept less puzzling by resolving it into others that are comparatively less so. (It thus became commonplace, for example, to speak of Hume’s “analysis” of the idea of causation.) The original meaning of the term analytic in “analytic philosophy,” however, was linked to a very particular quarrel with a traditional conception of the relation between philosophy and logic.

From the beginnings of Western philosophy in ancient Greece, philosophers have reflected on the precise relation between philosophy and logic. Thus, only a few pages into his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle raises the following three inter-related questions: Is it the business of a single unitary form of inquiry to uncover and investigate first principles, or are there two distinct forms of such inquiry—philosophy and logic? If there are two, how are they related? If there is only one, how can philosophy and logic be two aspects of a single undertaking?

Aristotle’s approach to these questions in those pages and in related works—the way he carved out what the subject matter and nature of logic is, and explained how its relation to philosophy ought to be conceived—shaped much of the entire subsequent tradition of Western philosophy. For more than two millennia, his logical theory provided an essential part of the framework within which philosophical reflection proceeded. Through much of the nineteenth century, many philosophers agreed that a proper understanding of what metaphysics is (and thus also what it is not) must be thoroughly grounded in Aristotelian logic.

That changed with Frege, who initiated a revolution in the underlying philosophical conception of what logic is, as well as much of the actual technical detail of logic: how logical notation works, and what logical proof involves. This radical upheaval was guided by certain philosophical concerns but

spurred a rethinking of what philosophy is. The new developments in logic were widely understood as making possible new forms of logical analysis: complex propositions could be clarified by showing how they are logically articulated into their constituent parts. At the center of the subsequent tradition of “analytic” philosophy, then, is a series of debates over the philosophical significance and limitations of these forms of logical analysis.

This volume is an introduction to thinkers who have figured significantly in the analytic tradition. It begins with certain philosophers—Kant among them—whose work forms the essential background to the emergence of the tradition, followed by Frege and the other founders of the tradition. It then moves on to their immediate successors, and continues into the present generation. The relatively small number of thinkers whose importance in shaping the tradition is beyond dispute have been given special attention and space. The volume is divided into seven parts. In some cases, the groupings are primarily chronological; in others, they are mainly thematic. While other ways of organizing these selections are certainly possible, this structure should be helpful to readers new to much of what follows, and to instructors as well.

The first two parts are devoted to the intellectual background and initial emergence of the analytic tradition—setting the stage and introducing the players of our drama’s opening scenes, as it were. Part I sketches some of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophical currents against which the early analytic tradition arose and to which it was often responding. Part II presents an overview of the tradition’s founding figures and the various forms of radical break from the philosophical past that each sought to effect.

The next two parts examine the two subsequent movements that were in closest dialogue with the founders of analytic philosophy: pragmatism and logical positivism. Pragmatism originated in the United States. At first it was mostly quite hostile to analytic philosophy; but it gradually entered into constructive dialogue with the analytic tradition, and eventually was almost entirely absorbed into it. Logical positivism began primarily in Austria and Germany; but after most of its central figures were driven into exile in the 1930s it flourished in new Anglo-American homes, eventually becoming a major conduit for spreading the analytic tradition throughout the entirety of the English-speaking philosophical world. In the mid-twentieth century its popularity and influence were far-reaching, and its implications seemed intellectually momentous—not least in its privileging of topics such as the philosophy of mathematics and of science and in its relative disdain for other areas previously prominent in philosophical inquiry, such as aesthetics, ethics, and political philosophy (not to mention most other philosophical traditions past and present).

The last three parts of the volume trace the trajectory of the analytic tradition from the middle of the twentieth century to the present. Part V focuses on the 1950s and 1960s, when it began to become far more internally varied, more open to dialogue with other philosophical traditions—and more beset by various forms of intramural intellectual strife as well. During this same period, a number of leading figures also sought to redefine the tradition’s relation to the philosophical past, finding new sources of intellectual nourishment and stimulation in classical figures such as Aristotle and Kant. Part VI

surveys salient features of the renaissance of moral and political philosophy within the analytic tradition during the second half of the twentieth century. Finally, Part VII samples the remarkable diversity of the most recent phase of the analytic tradition. These selections are inevitably the most controversial choices, for it is not yet clear who among today's philosophers will be of interest and deemed important (or at least historically significant) in the future, and who will deserve inclusion in addition to (or instead of) the figures represented here.

This volume's organization enables it to be used in very different ways by different sorts of readers. The seven main groupings in effect offer points of entry for those seeking to find their bearings in the tradition. For those who already know their way around in it, alternative groupings may suggest themselves. Instructors and individual readers are encouraged to bring figures from different parts of the volume together where and when doing so makes sense to them, in light of their varying purposes and interests. Similarly, we hope they will wish to supplement these readings with works by other figures, or with further writings by those included below: anyone who teaches courses on figures and developments in this tradition (or who simply is familiar with some parts of it) is likely to find any number of favorites missing. Considerations of space have forced us to omit a number of authors whom we would gladly have included, as well as outstanding pieces by our featured authors that we regret having had to forgo.

Numerous considerations governed our choices. Comprehensiveness of coverage has at times been sacrificed for the sake of sharpness and clarity of outline in depicting the tradition's main lines of development. Because this volume focuses on those areas in which the analytic tradition has made the most lasting and diverse contributions—logic, metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of natural science, ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law—it has had to omit a great deal. The significant contributions made by analytic philosophers to aesthetics, philosophy of social science, philosophy of religion, and other areas could not be adequately represented here.

The prominent figures in the first three generations of analytic philosophy, as well as the predecessors and contemporaries to whom they were responding, were all white males. Beginning in the 1940s, however, an initially small but extraordinary cohort of women philosophers emerged—Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch among them. They gave expression to a new range of philosophical perspectives and concerns, to the great benefit of analytic philosophy's approach to a broad range of issues. While the analytic tradition did not thereupon cease to be a male-dominated affair, it was decisively altered by this development. Young women students of analytic philosophy suddenly were presented with female philosophical exemplars of originality and genius, and more such role models have emerged in each subsequent generation. For example, arguably the leading moral philosopher and the leading philosopher of action of the present generation are both women—Christine Korsgaard and Jennifer Hornsby. Moreover, the question of the relation between

philosophers' gender and their manner of doing philosophy has itself become a topic of philosophical reflection within the tradition.

This is just one aspect of a larger trend. As analytic philosophy has developed over the past few decades, summing up its nature in any sort of tidy formula has grown almost impossible. It has become not only increasingly intellectually open to other traditions of thought but also more pluralistic in its aims and methods, more varied in the range of philosophical topics that it treats, and more international and pluralistic in its profile. The final portion of this volume offers some glimpses into these quite different varieties of contemporary analytic philosophy. The selections from authors of Indian and African heritage (alongside those of European and North American lineage) exemplify one strand of this tapestry, while the range of areas and topics treated in these selections (such as the philosophy of action, the philosophy of economics, feminism, philosophical questions of sex and gender, and the philosophy of race) indicates other dimensions of analytic philosophy's ever more pronounced tendency toward internal diversification.

Since the primary task of this volume is to provide an introduction to the analytic tradition as a part of the history of Western philosophy since Kant, our concluding selections afford only a taste of its contemporary diversity—albeit a revealing and significant one. Instructors may well find that they wish to supplement this volume in a number of possible ways; and we hope that readers more generally, after sampling the texts offered here, will find that they want to read more by many of these authors. But these selections will broadly acquaint readers with the narrative trajectory and intellectual profile of the main currents of the analytic tradition.

This volume will be useful to anyone—both in and beyond the academy—who wishes to learn more about analytic philosophy. It also should be a richly and enduringly useful part of the personal library of any student in philosophy (or in any other discipline) who wants an overview of this philosophical tradition, and who wants to have the resources it provides readily at hand. But its main anticipated use, naturally, is as a primary text in philosophy courses dealing with this tradition, in whole or in part. While most philosophy departments have one or more faculty members who can easily teach a survey course in the history of early modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, the same is often not true of the history of the analytic tradition. Even in a department replete with analytic philosophers, most will have expertise in a particular subspecialty of contemporary analytic philosophy and may have remarkably spotty knowledge of the major landmarks in the history of their own tradition outside it. This volume is intended to help instructors who may not be intimately familiar with the history of analytic philosophy offer a sensibly designed survey course, as well as to provide those who already know that history well with a source book that furnishes a richer array of primary texts and materials to draw on than has previously been available in a single volume, for use in courses at any level.

The contents of this volume clearly exceed what can be covered in a single semester, or perhaps even two. But courses in this general area can take a variety of forms. For example, a one-semester survey of the whole period might concentrate only on the selections from major figures, with students being

encouraged merely to take note of and sample the omitted figures on their own. Alternatively, a course might focus on particular topics and areas of philosophy, thereby rendering some of the selections from major figures less relevant while bringing to the fore others from less eminent authors. The volume has been designed so that it can be used in a wide variety of courses; indeed, it can serve as the single primary text in several such courses that might be taken successively.

These intended uses have largely determined the length of the individual selections and how they have been excerpted, as well as the amount of material included from each author. In a fair number of cases, one or two relatively brief selections provide only a sampling of the sort of work for which the author is deserving of recognition and attention. In the case of major figures, on the other hand, we have attempted to offer enough of their work—selected for its relative accessibility as well as for its significance and interest—to enable instructors to devote considerable attention to that author individually, or even develop a whole course on a relatively small number of such authors with few if any supplementary texts. Other figures fall in between these extremes.

Some authors are represented by substantial portions of the particular major works that clearly constitute their primary claims to enduring importance (sometimes along with brief samplings of their other writings). In other cases, considerations of accessibility, length, and pedagogical usefulness in an introductory course have been allowed to trump those of intrinsic philosophical significance. Thus we have omitted some classic texts that would be appropriately assigned only within the context of a comparatively advanced course in philosophy. For yet other authors, the volume includes selections from a variety of different works because no single text has a claim to paramount importance. Where we rely on excerpts rather than complete texts, we have sought to ensure that each selection stands well on its own and that readers will be able to get a fair sense of what it is in and about the work that matters. Every effort has been made to maximize focus on the central ideas of our featured authors, while minimizing distracting side issues and less essential lines of thought or argument.

The general introduction of this volume provides an overview of the analytic tradition as a whole and discusses such fundamental questions as, What is analytic philosophy? When, how, and with whom did this tradition begin? How is it related to the neighboring interpretive tradition? If analytic philosophers disagree even about the answers to the three preceding questions (and they do), then what holds the tradition together? It also touches on some of the more remarkable and distinctive aspects of the tradition that render such apparently straightforward questions about it actually anything but straightforward. The aim is to provide a genuinely informative introduction to the topic of this volume as a whole, while avoiding as far as possible the historical simplifications and falsifications that tend to characterize overarching big-picture accounts of what analytic philosophy is.

Each part of the volume has its own introduction, which explains its scope and intention, contents, structure, and internal organization, as well as the developments and figures to be encountered in it and how they relate to those

in the other parts. Each of these introductions seeks to orient the reader to a particular episode in the story of analytic philosophy, while paying attention to the various surprising moments of local nuance and complexity that help shape that specific moment in the overall narrative. They aim to bring out affinities within each grouping of thinkers, while also noting their various points of significant divergence (including points of merely apparent affinity that turn out to conceal deeper differences). Far more detail about each of our featured authors is provided in the introductory headnote that precedes each author's work. Footnotes provide definitions and explanations of technical and confusing terms, explain allusions to other thinkers and their views, and elucidate the author's own ideas when that may be needed.

Each headnote begins with a brief introduction to the individual philosopher's thought, followed by biographical information, and then by a more detailed discussion of his or her major contributions and their significance, illuminating the broad outlines of the intellectual trajectory of the individual thinker. The headnotes focus primarily on helpful background and context for the selections included from their work, and secondarily on how the selections relate to the thinker's overall philosophical vision and to significant aspects of his or her work not represented in our selections. A separate bibliographical section in the back of the volume provides information both about primary sources—writings by the figure available in English or English translation—and about the secondary literature available in English.

The volume closes with an Afterword that considers some of the extraordinary metamorphoses undergone by the analytic tradition as it has matured, followed by an extensive Timeline that situates the authors and selections in the volume in relation to events and figures contemporaneous to them. The Afterword takes the measure of various transformations in the tradition's understanding of itself, especially with respect to its relation to the interpretive tradition, its attitude toward the history of philosophy generally, and its posture more specifically toward its own history. By orienting the reader to analytic philosophy's evolving relations with its supposed philosophical others—its philosophical neighbors, the prior history of philosophy, and its own past—the Afterword highlights some significant respects in which the analytic tradition continues to be very much alive and a tradition in the making.

