The conceptual equivalence between self-consciousness and consciousness of one's self has been taken for granted ever since its terms became available with the advent of modern philosophy. In this lecture, I propose to show that Sartre's contention that there is no "I" lying behind consciousness (in *The Transcendence of the Ego*) and Anscombe's claim that "I" is not a referring expression (in her essay "The First Person") articulate a single negative insight into the spuriousness of the canonical equivalence. I shall contend that doing justice to self-consciousness, far from requiring us to embrace this equivalence, requires us to forsake it in even its most innocent-seeming version.

Jean-Philippe Narboux graduated from Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. Currently he is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bordeaux and Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.

He currently works on the topic of negation.

Jean-Philippe Narboux will also make available:
- "Speaking of Oneself and Speaking of One's Self"
- "Pensées en première personne et Cogitationes cartésiennes" ("I-thoughts and Cartesian Cogitationes")

If you are interested in reading or discussing these texts by and with our guest, please contact:
bastian.schoenfeld@uni-leipzig.de

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**WE WILL DISCUSS**

**Self-Consciousness in Sartre and Anscombe**

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