

HUMBOLDT CONVERSATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY

15:15-18:00
GWZ H2 1.16

MAY 30



My work to date has been primarily focused on the thought of Frank Ramsey, particularly in relation to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but also in respect of mathematics, logic and pragmatism. More recently, I have defended a version of the identity theory of truth. I am now in the process of initiating a research project that stems from interesting intersections of these two distinct strands of work, and which has as its focus the very limits of thought itself.

STEVEN METHVEN

Worcester College, Oxford

ON SAYING WHAT ONE THINKS

Recently, a number of authors have attributed to Frank Ramsey a dispositionalist view of belief contents, where such a view identifies a belief with a disposition or set of dispositions to behave thus-and-so under certain circumstances. Further, they argue that he was right to hold that view. I take issue with both of these claims. Against the second, I argue that a dispositionalist view of this kind faces grave difficulties when we reflect on the fact that we can, very often and quite simply, say what we think. Against the first, I argue that we may find within Ramsey's work the beginnings of a more sophisticated account of such contents.

For more information, additional reading and registration please contact:
martijnwallage@gmail.com

FAGI 
FORSCHUNGSKOLLEG
ANALYTIC GERMAN IDEALISM


Alexander von Humboldt
Stiftung/Foundation