Thomas Meyer works as a Research Associate at the Department of Philosophy at Humboldt University Berlin. He received his PhD with a dissertation on causation and responsibility in Hegel at the University of Münster under the supervision of Michael Quante and Thomas Gutmann. His main research interests are: Hegel, action theory, theories of causation, philosophy of law (especially criminal law) and moral philosophy.

Since the seminal papers by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel (1979) moral luck has been discussed intensely in contemporary analytical philosophy of action, law, morality and metaethics. Roughly the term ‘moral luck’ stands for the fact that we sometimes make an agent responsible for a harm although it was not under his or her control to bring about that harm (I exclude cases of positive outcomes). The problem of moral luck then consists in the tension between this observation and the widely accepted moral principle that we should not make an agent responsible for things beyond his or her control. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right contains an account of moral luck that has often been neglected (although mentioned by some, e.g. Wood and Speight). I will present Hegel’s account of how to deal with the problem of moral luck. I reconstruct his account in terms of the contemporary debate.